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Peruvian vocational and technical students  often end up working
in the same jobs for the same earnings as academic students  -
probably because teaching in both streams  is largely "chalk and
taLk"  and vocational and technical education students get little
"hands-on" technical experience in school.
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The costs of the academic and the vocational  than the quality of education for academic
and technical education (VTE) streams in Peru  students in the same areas.
are very close.  What's more, the monetary
returns to, and occupational profiles of, gradu-  Why, for other groups, do the two educa-
ates of the two streams are almost identical-  tional streamis  produce almost identical retums
with one exception.  and graduates with similar occupational pro-
files?  VTE institutions, funded at the same level
For the self-employed who live in urban  as academic institutions, can't afford the inputs
areas outside Lima, the retums to secondary  that make VTE genuinely technical, so the
technical education are significantly lower than  students get little "hands-on" technical experi-
the retums to secondary general education. This  ence in school.  Despite declared differences in
may be because the quality of VTE programs for  emphases and goals, programs and curricula in
urban students outside Lima is generally lower  the two streams are substantially alike - largely
"chalk and talk."
This paper is a product of the Education and Employment Division, Population and
Human Resources Department. Copies  are available free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact C. Cristobal, room S6-001,
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1.  Introduction
The  purpose  of this  study  is  to assess  the  economic  returns  to
vocational  and  technical  education  (VTE)  in  Peru.  Studies  in  other
developing  countries  have  concluded  tilat  TE is  more  costly  to  provide  than
'general'  (i.e.,  academic)  education,  yet  it  yields  returns  that  are  not
significantly  different. This  has led  to the  policy  recommendation  that
countries  should  promote  general  education  at the  expense  of  VTE.  For  the
creation  of occupation-  and  job-specific  skills,  countries  should,
according  to  this  view,  rely  not  on school-based  instruction,  but  rather  oa
training  to  be given  to individuals  after  they  have  left  school  and  entered
the  labor  market. Such  training  can  be provided  either  on the  job  or in
industry-based  training  centers  including  proprietary  institutions.
The  relative  costs  of and  returns  to  VTE  and  general  education
are investigated  here  for  Peru.  The  paper  proceeds  as follows. Section  2
describes  the  system  of education  in Peru  and  changes  that  have  occurred  in
this  system  over  time.  Section  3 surveya  the (relatively  sparse)
literature  on comparative  rates  of return  to  VTE and  general  education.
Sections  4 and  5  describe,  respectively,  the  data  used  for  this  study  and
the  model  used  to estimate  the  returns  to  different  levels  and  types  of
education. Section  6 reports  the  results  of the  empirical  analysis.
Section  7 introduces  data  obtained  from  Peru's  Ministry  of Education  on the
relative  costs  of  VTE  and  general  education. The  concluding  section  8
considers  the  implications,  if  any,  of the  findings  for  educational  policy.
2.  VTE in  Peru
The  recent  history  of education  in  Peru,  as it  relates  to the
provision  of  VTE, can  be divided  into  three  distinct  phases. Prior  to
1972,  and  again  after  1982,  official  policy  split  the  system  of  education
into  two  separate  sub-systems,  or educational  "streams."  The  focus  of the
general  stream  was  on the  development  of  broad  cognitive  skills  assumed  to
be  useful  in  a  wide  variety  of  occupations  and  necessary  also  for  students
who  wanted  to continue  their  studies  at  higher  levels  of the  education
system. The  VTE stream,  in  addition  to teaching  these  basic  skills,  was
intended  to  orient  students  generally  to the  world  of  work and  provide  them
with  training  specific  to  a future  occupation  of their  choice. Between
1972  and  1982,  there  was an  attempt  to  merge  the  two  scholastic  streams
and,  for  most students  up through  secondary  education,  to increase  the
vocational  content  of the  curriculum.  This  attempt  to "vocationalize"  or
'diversify'  primary  and  secondary  education  is  one  with  many  historical
1 Education  and  Employment  Division,  Population  and  Human  Resources
Department,  The  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.  20433. The  authors
acknowledge  the  useful  comments  of  Ana  Maria  Arriagada,  Elizabeth  King,  and
Philip  Musgrove  and  the  assistance,  early  in the  preparation  of this  study,
of Roxana  Carvalho.parallels  in  other  parts  of the  world  (Psacharopoulos  and  Loxley  1985,  pp.
11-16).
The  distinction  on paper  between  VTE  and  general  education  during
he fl.rat  period,  in  what can  be referred  to as  the 'traditional"  system  of
Peruvion  education,  is illustrated  in figure  1. Students  who chose  the  VTE
option  under  this  system  could  cross  over from  the  general  stream  at either
of two  points  --  after  completing  primary  education  (into  a seoondary
technical  school)  or after  completing  general  seeondary  education  (into  a
post-secondary  polytechnic  or vocational  institute).
Secondary  education  consisted  of two  sequential  cycles. All
students  followed  the  same  curriculum  in the  three-year  lower  cycle  of the
general  stream;  in  the  two-year  upper  cycle,  they  could  choose  between
letras  (humanities)  or ciencias  (sciences).  In  the  lower  cycle  of the  VTE
stream,  students  took  many  academic  subjects,  plus  a smaller  number  of
technical  subjects  designed  to orient  them  generally  to  the  world  of  work.
In  the  upper  cycle,  studente  entered  separate  agricultural,  business,  or
applied  science  institutes  where  they  began  their  specialization, 2 but  even
here,  the  curricu)um  often  stressed  quite  general  skills  with  Sroad
occupational  applications.
Post-secondary  VTE institutes  were  known  as Institu._ le
Educacion  Tecnica  Superior  (IETSs).  The IETSs  provided  trainLiZ  in
professional  areas  such  as agriculture,  business  administration,  public
relations,  interior  decorating,  and  cosmetology.  Study  at an IETS
provided  a  popular  alternative  for  students  unable  to obtain  admission  to a
university.
Many new  secondary  technical  schools  and  higher-level  technical
institutes  were  established  during  the  1950s  and  1960s  to  help  satisfy  the
growing  demand  for  education. Between  1955  and  the  late  1960s,  enrollments
in the  VTE  stream  increased  approximately  fourfold  (Romero  1963;  Paulston
1971). This  expansion  matched  the  rapid  increase  of education  in  general.
VTE  institutions  accounted  for  approximately  18  percent  of all  secondary
and  tertiary  enrollments  over  most  of this  period  (World  Bank 1988).
Despite  their  expansion,  however,  there  were reasons  to doubt  the
capacity  of VTE  institutions  to satisfy  the  specific  vocational  objectives
set  out for  them. Because  planning  and  guidance  were inadequate,  some
students  were trained  in  areas  for  which  there  was little  or no demand.
For  many  others,  the  education  given  them  did  not  prepare  them  well for  the
jobs  that  were available. 'Blackboard  teaching"  was the  dominant  mode  of
instruction.  Most schools  and  institutes  operated  with inadequate
materials  and  equipment,  with the  result  that  students  spent  little  or no
2 Students  could  select  either  a  general  course  of study  in  such  areas
as  agriculture  and  business  or trade-specific  courses  in  bookkeeping,
shorthand,  typing,  or animal  husbandry.  Alternatively,  boys  could
specialize  in  carr4ntry,  metalworking,  or automotive  mechanics,  and  girls
could  choose  weaving,  dressmaking,  embroidery,  or decorative  arts.
2Figure  1
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Primary  Secondary  Tertiarytime  doing  practical  work. About  80  percent  of  the  teachers  in  VTE
institutions  were Hunderqualified"  to teach  technical  subjects  (Paulston
1971,  World  Bank 1973). Moreover,  many  students  never  intended  to be
technicians  when they  enrolled  in  VTE  programs  in  the  first  place  but,
instead,  did  so in  the (usually  futile)  hope  of  continuing  their  study
later  at a  university.
Given  tho  deficiencies  in  facilities  and  personnel  and  the
prevailing  preferences  of those  enrolled,  many  VTE institutions  had  little
real  choice  but to  offer  programs  that  resembled  those  given  in  the  general
educational  streams,  with  weight  given  to the  liberal  arts  and  relatively
little  to those  technical  subjects  linked  to  specific  occupational
outcomes. Only  a small  proportion  of  VTE graduates  obtained  employment  in
areas  directly  related  to their  areas  of  VTE  concentration.
In response  to the  perceived  problems  surrounding  VTE,  teru's
military  government  announced  a program  of educational  reform  in 1972. The
reforw  was designed  to enhance  student  employment  prospects  by raising  the
quality  of instruction  and  increasing  education's  relevance  to the  labor
market. 3 The  crux  of the  program  was its  'diversified'  curriculum,  i.e.,  a
merging  of the  academic  and  technical  streams.
More specifically,  the  reform  mandated  nine  years  of 'basic"
education,  which  was  supposed  to replace  the  primary  and  lower  secondary
cycles  of the  traditional  system. Toward  the  end  of  this  basic  education,
all  pupils  were to  be introduced  to  practical  work,  after  which  all
continuing  students  would  attend  new  three-year  schools  known  as Escuelas
Superiores  de Educacion  Profesional  (ESEPs). The  curriculum  of the  ESEPs
was to  be highly  practical,  with some  academic  courses  included  but  far
fewer  than in  the  traditional  system  of general  education. Only  after
secondary  education  would  students  under  the  new  system  be split  into
separate  streams. Some  of the  continuing  students  would  go to  university,
and  the rest  would  enter  Second-Cycle  (Ciclo  II)  ESEPs. 4
The  reform  program  was implemented  slowly,  and  it  was relatively
short-lived.  Nonetheless,  it did  have  an impact  on Peruvian  education.
First-Cycle  ESEPs  increased  in number,  from  just  nine  schools  and  about
9,000  students  in 1975  to 72 schools  and  30,000  students  in 1981  (Gray
1983;  World  Bank  1982). At the  post-secondary  level,  three  Second-Cycle
3 Earlier,  in 1961,  private  employers  in the  manufacturing  sector  had
organized  their  own  non-formal  system  to provide  training  for  those  leaving
the formal  education  system. This  system,  known  as the  Servicio  Nacional
de  Aprendizaie  y  Trabaio  Industrial  (SENATI),  continues  to this  day.
SENATI  centers  offer  training  programs  in  a  variety  of technical  areas.
During  the  first  decade  of its  operation,  over  100,000  industrial  workers
participated  in  SENATI  courses  (World  Bank 1973).
4  Not  part  of the  or.ginal  reform  of 1972,  the  Second-Cycle  ESEPs  were
introduced  in  the late  1970s  by the  succeeding  military  administration.
They  were designed  to replace  the  old  IETSs.
4ESEPs  were constructed,  and  approximately  20 of the  older  IETSs  were
converted  to Second-Cycle  ESEPs. There  was, however,  considerable
uncertsinty  about  the  value  of ESEP  courses  to  universities  and  employers.
As a consequence,  many  ESEPs  were  under-enrolled,  and  most  students
continued  to attend  traditional  secondary  schools  and  tertiary  institutes
(World  Bank 1982).
In 1982,  soon  after  ,  .'s  return  to civilian  rule,  President
Belaunde  Terry  announced  a "new"  -eform  which,  with  only  m`nor  differences,
amounted  to a return  to the  tradt'ional  system  of educatior.  The  program
to exFand  the  number  of First-Cycle  ESEPs  was halted;  students  already
enrolled  were  permitted  to complete  their  studies,  but  no new  entrants  were
accepted. Second-Cycle  ESEPs  were  placed  under  review,  and  their  future
remains  uncertain.
3.  Previous  Studies
Skill  formation  through  vocational  and  technical  education  has
been  an important  part  of Peru's  human  capital  investment  strategy. In
this  regard,  the  situation  in Peru  does  not  differ  from  what is  found  in
many  other  parts  of the  world. Table  1  shows  the  proportion  of central
government  recurrent  secondary  education  expenditures  allocated  to  VTE in
Peru  and,  at an aggregate  level,  in  several  of the  world's  principal
regions. Peru's  proportionate  allocation  to  VTE  appears  somewhat  above
averat'  for  developing  countries,  and  below  that  found  in  the
industrialized  European  countries.
VTE  programs  are  intended  to enhance  worker  productivity  and
increase  earnings  by reducing  skill  shortages  and  promoting  positive
attitudes  towards  work,  especially  manual  work.  There  is,  however,  a
growing  research  literature  suggesting  that  VTE  programs,  as  presently
constituted  in  many developing  countries,  fail  to offer  returns
commensurate  with their  costs  (Blaug  1973;  Fong  1976;  Psacharapoulos  1986;
Metcalf  1985). A number  of  studies  have  found  returns  to  VTE and  to
general  education  that  are  comparable,  but  higher  costs  in  the  case  of  VTE.
To the  extent  that  these  findings  are  corroborated  in  the  same  countries
and  elsewhere,  VTE is  shown  to be an inferior  investment  alternative.
Although  the  available  evidence  on the  relative  costs  of VTE  and
general  education  nearly  always  shows  VTE  to  be the  more expensive  option,
the  size  of the  cost  differential  varies  considerably  across  studies. In
Colombia  and  Tanzania,  secondary  VTE  has  been shown  to cost  15  to 20
percent  more then  secondary  general  education  (Psacharopoulos  and  Loxley
1984),  in  Venezuela  twice  as  much (Psacharopoulos  and  Steier  1987),  anid  in
Jordan  ten  times  as  much (Bukhari  1968). Such  differences  in  the  relative
costs  of VTE from  country  to country  are  an indication  of the  enormous
range  in  curricular  content  of  programs  that  are  all  labeled  "technical  and
vocational."
5Table  1
EXP tDITURE ON VOCATIONAL  AND  TECHNICAL  EDUCATION
AS PERCENT  OF CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT  RECURRENT
EXPENDITURE  ON ALL SECONDARY
EDUCATION,  CIRCA  1980
Country/region  Percent
Peru  27
Latin  America  and  the  25
Caribbean  (22)
Africa  (22)  18
Asia (18)  16
Europe  (13)  34
Note:  In  parentheses,  the  number  of countries  in
each  regional  sample.
Source: Unesco  (1e6).
Because  the  evidence  on returns  is  mixed,  conclusions  with regard
to rates  of return  are  also  mixed. Of the  studies  that  report  both  costs
and  returns  and  then  calculate  a  rate  of  return,  a  higher  rate  for
investment  in  secondary  VTE is  reported  for  Brazil  (20  percent  vs  16
percent,  Psacharopoulos  1987)  and  for  Venzuela  (26  percent  vs  20  percent,
Psacharopoulos  and  Steier  1987). Comparable  rates  to secondary  VTE  and
general  education  are  reported  for  Colombia  (Psacharopoulos  1984)  and  for
Cyprus  and  Taiwan  (Psacharopoulos  1985).
Past  studies  comparing  VTE  and  general  education  have focused  on
secondary  education  almost  exclusively.  This  study  of Peru  will be one  of
the  first  to extend  the  comparison  to tertiary  education.
64.  The  Peruvian  VTS  Data  Set
To assess  the  relative  returns  to  VTE  and  general  education  in
Peru,  we make  use  of the  Peruvian  Living  Standards  Survey  (rLSS)  national
probability  sample  of  hiuseholds  and  individuals  surveyed  in 198511986.5
From  the  full  PLSS  sample  we drew  a  subsample  (n  - 2,210)  of all  urban
males  between  the  ages  of 15  and  69  who  were either  employ,ed  in  the  private
wage sector  or  were "self-employed,"  that  is,  working  for  pay in  a family
enterprise.  Rural  workers  were excluded  from  the  present  study  because  of
the  small  number  of such  individuals  with  VTE. 6
The  breakdown  of the  sample  between  those  who are  self-employed
and  those  who are  wage-employed,  and  between  those  living  in  Metropolitan
Lima  and  those  living  in  all  other  urban  areas  (OUAs)  is  presented  in table
2.  The distribution  across  the  four  cells  is  nearly  equal,  the largest
group  being  the  wage-employed  in  Lima (756),  and  the  smallest  the
self-employed  in  Lima (427).
S  The  PLSS  was implemented  between  June  1985  and  July 1986  by  Peru's
Instituto  Nacional  de Estadistica  (INE). The  survey  questionnaire  was
developed  by the  World  Bank  in  collaboration  with INE  and  the  Central  Bank
of Peru  and  adapted  from  a  prototype  questionnaire  used  earlier  in  Cote
d'Ivoire. A parallel  study  to  this  one  comparing  the  returns  to  VTE  and
general  education  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  is available  (Grootaert  1988). For
details  about  the  PLSS  survey  and  sample,  see  Grootaert  and  Arriagada  (1986).
6  Analyses  of the  earnings  of similar  categories  of Peruvian  workers,
without  the  focus  on VTE,  are  described  elsewhere  --  see  Stelener,
Arriagada,  and  Moock  (1987),  which  look  at the  returns  to education  in
general,  and  Arriagada  (1988),  which  focuses  on the  returns  to training.
These  two  studies  are  confined  also  to  males,  but  they  they  use  an  upper
age  cut-off  of 65 rather  than  69 and  they  include  workers  in rural  as  well
as  urban  areas  and  in  public  as  well  as private  employment.  Female
workers,  for  whom the  specification  of an appropriate  earnings  function
will tend  to differ,  are  treated  in  King (forthcoming)  and  Arriagada
(forthcoming).
7I  Table 2
DISTRIBUTION  OF SAMPLE  BY LOCATION  AND SECTOR
Metropolitan  Lima  Other  urban  areas  Sector  totals
Number Column  Z  Number Column  Z  Number Column  %
Wage employees
Number  756  63.9  527  51.3  1,283  58.1
Row Z  58.9  (34.2)  41.1  (23.9)  100.0  (58.  "!
Self-employed
Nuaber  427  36.1  500  48.7  927  41.9
Row !  46.1  (19.3)  53.9  (22.6)  100.0  (41.9)
Location  totals
Number  1,183  100.0  1,027  100.0  2,210  100.0
Row  %  53.5  (53.5)  46.5  (46.5)  100.0  (100.0)
Note:  Percentages  of the  grand  total  (2,210)  are  in  parentheses.
8TSle  3 shows  that,  compared  to those  in  wage employment,  the
self-employed  re  on average  *.z  years  older,  they  have  completed  about  ane
year  less  of  4 0hool,  and  they  earn  about  the  same  amount  per  hour  but  work
eight  hours  more  pec  week.  Workers  in  OUAs  are  about  one  year  older  and
have  completed  a  year  and  a  half less  schooling;  they  earn  1.25  Intis  less
per  hour  and  work three  hours  more  per  week  than  workers  in  Lima.
Table  3
AGE,  S(HXLDM,  EARNflM,  AND  H1AS  W)REI  BY  T=A.&ON  AND  SIP,
Years  of  schol Hourly  earnin8s  In  Hours  worked
Age in years  completed  June  1985 Intis  per  week
Ietropolitan  LIM
1Wge  ezployees  33.6  (12.3)  9.2  (3.4)  6.71  (7.8)  48.43 (14.8)
Self-etloyed  39.8  (13.3)  8.4  (3.9)  6.37 (6.5)  50.70 (21.4)
AUl  Lim  wrkers  35.9  (13.0)  8.9  (3.6)  6.59 (7.4)  49.25  (17.5)
Other  urban  areas
Wage  efployees  33.7  (12.6)  7.5  (3.5)  4.95  (5.4)  49.51  (16.4)
Self-eaployed  40.1  (13.3)  7.2  (3.8)  5.75  (7.3)  50.58  (20.4)
AU.OU  (oUwkers  36.8  (13.3)  7.4  (3.7)  5.34  (6.4)  49.98  (18.5)
All  urban  areas  of  Peru
VWa  eaployees  33.6  (12.4)  8.5  (3.6)  5.98  (7.0)  48.87  (15.5)
Self-eiployed  40.0  (13.3)  7.8  (3.9)  6.04  (7.0)  50.58  (20.8)
All  urbar  workers 36.3  (13.2)  8.2  (3.7)  6.01  (7.0)  49.59  (17.9)
Note:  Means  (standard  deviaticns  in parentheses).
Table  4 shows  the  number  and  percentage  of  workers  in each  of the
samples  who finished  their  education  at any  particular  level  and  type  of
school. ;-nly  1.5  percent  of  urban  male  workers  (13  and  21 individuals,
respectively,  in  the  Lima  and  OUA samples)  never  went to school  at  all.
About  two-thirds  (1,477  individuals)  and  nearly  one-fifth  (413  individuals)
continued  their  education  past  the  primary  and  secondary  levels,
9respectively.  Of  the  1,477  individuals  who  continued  past  primary  school,
233  (16  percent)  entered  the  VTE  stream,  129  immudiately  after  primary
school  (into  a  secondary  technical  school  or  First-Cycle  ESEP)  and  104
after  secondary  school  (into  an  IETS  or  Second-Cycle  ESEP).  Of  those  whose
highest  schooling  level  was  secondary,  12  percent  did  VTE;  of  those  who
went  on  to  tertiary  education,  25  percent  took  VTE.
Table  4
HIQ  EDUATINCR  IE\  ATIhE  BY  IDCATICN  AID SECIR
SySecondary  Post-seec
Ncme  Primaty  tecldcal  general  aixmv.  University  Total
Metropolitan IM
VWgeaeployem  8  L39  38  392  36  143  756
(1.1)  (18.4)  (5.0)  (51.9)  (4.8)  (18.9)  (100.0)
Self -eqWlyed  5  138  26  163  22  73  427
(1.2)  (k2.3)  (6.0)  (38.2)  (5.2)  (17.1)  (100.0)
Al1l  morkwors  13  277  64  555  58  216  1,183
(1.1)  (23.4)  (5.4)  (46.9)  (4.9)  (18.3)  (100.0)
Other urban areas
Wage  epwlyeee  7  206  38  209  26  41  527
(1.3)  (39.1)  (7.2)  (39.7)  (4.9)  (7.8)  (100.0)
Self-oplyed  13  217  27  171  20  52  500
(2.6)  (43.3)  (5.4)  (34.2)  (4.0)  (10.4)  (100.0)
All GA  woPsers  21  423  65  380  46  93  1,027
(2.0)  (41.2)  (6.3)  (37.0)  (4.5)  (9.1)  (100.0)
All  urban  areas  of  Peru
Wage  employees  15  345  76  601  62  184  1,283
(1.2)  (26.9)  (5.9)  (46.8)  (4.8)  (14.3)  (100.0)
Self-employed  18  355  53  334  42  125  927
(2.0)  (38.3)  (5.7)  (36.0)  (406)  (13.5)  (100.0)
All  urban  wrkers  33  700  129  935  10&  309  2,210
(1.5)  (31.7)  (5.8)  (42.3)  (4.7)  (14.0)  (100.0)
Note:  Number  of  orkers  (percentage  of ,rcup  in  parentieses).
10Since  we do not  have  direct  information  on the  calendar  years
during  which  individuals  in  the  sample  attended  school,  we do not  know  the
exact  proportion  of the  sample  still  in school  subsequent  to 1972,  when the
country's  education  reform  was announced.  However,  if  we assume  that  every
individual  in  the  sample  began  primary  school  at the  age  of six  and
remained  in  school  without  interruption  until  reaching  the  highest  level
completed,  then  we can  say  that  73  percent  of those  in the  sample  who
continued  beyond  the  first  three  years  of secondary  school  finished  school
before  1972  and,  necessarily  therefore,  received  a traditional  education  as
depicted  in  Figure  1. No more  than  27  percent  (290  individuals)  finished
school  later  than 1972  and  could  have,  for  this  reason  alone,  attended  a
First-  or Second-Cycle  ESEP. Since  the  reform  was never  fully  implemented,
the  actual  percentage,  though  not  known,  was  certainly  smaller  than  this.
5. The  Hourly  Earnings  Function
The  model  used  to compare  the  returns  to general  education  and  to
vocational/technical  education  (VTE)  in  Peru  is  derived  from  the  standard
human  capital  earnings  function  (see  Mincer  1974). The  means  and  standard
deviations  of all  of the  variables  used  in  the  analysis  are  given  in table
5.
Model  I.  We have  standardized  the  basic  human  capital  earnings
function  by hours  worked  and  extended  it to include,  in addition  to
schooling  and  experience,  other  socio-economic  and  institutional  factors
(Vm,  m-l,...,n)  that  may  be correlated  with  earnings. Moreover,  education
is  here  specified  as a set  of spline  variables  (Sj,  J-1,...,5)  so as  to
allow  the return  to an additional  year  of educati5n  to differ  by both  level
and  type  of education. Finally,  each  individual's  work  experience  is split
into  two  parts  (Xk,  k-1,2)  so  as to  distinguish  experience  in  the  present
job  from  experience  prior  to that. The  resulting  hourly  earnings  function
is  as follows:
lnYi  a +  EjPjSji  +  Ek7kXki  +  Ek5kXki 2 +  Emqmvmi  +  ei,
where  Yi is the  hourly  earnings  of the  i-th  worker,  '  P-i'  7k'  6k' and  Im
are  the  slopes  to be estimated,  and  ei is  a stochastic  disturbance  term.
The  dependent  variable  is  the  natural  logarithm  of self-reported
hourly  earnings. For  those  in  the -age  sector,  included  in "earnings"  in
addition  to  base  salary  are  all  bonuses  plus  the  monetary  value  of benefits
provided  by the  employer  such  as food,  housing,  and  clothing  (see  Stelener,
Arriagada,  and  Moock  1987). For  the  self-employed,  'earnings'  are  taken  to
be net  of all  production  costs.
Since  the  data  set  includes  information  only  on the  last  level  of
education  attended,  we do not  know  what  kind  of secondary  school  those  who
continued  to the  tertiary  level  actually  attended. We have  assumed  here
that  all  who continued  to a  university  or to a  post-secondary  VTE
institution  followed  a general  secondary  curriculum  and  that  no  one  who
went  to a secondary  technical  school  continued  beyond  that  level.
11I  Table  5
DISCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS  *
Metropolitao  Lima  Otber  urban  areas  All  urban  areas
Variable  name  Wage  eoployees  Self-employed  Wage  employees  Self-employed  both  sectors
Dependent  variable  (Y)
HOURLY  EIRNINGS  (June  1985  Inti)  6.71  (7.8)  6.37  (6.5) 4.95  (5.4) 5.15 (7.3) 6.01  (7.0)
Li  HOURLY  EARNINGS  1.53  (0.8)  1.48  (0.9) 1.18  (0.9) 1.29  (1.0) 1.38  (0.9)
Scnoolinf  (Si)
YRS  PRIMAIR  4.85  (0.7)  4.67  (0.9) 4.59  (1.0)  4.47  (1.2) 4.67  (1.0)
YRS  SICOIDARY  TICHNICAL  0.22  (1.0)  0.26  (1.0) 0.29  (1.1)  0.24  (1.0) 0.25  (1.0)
YRS  SICONDIAR  6NIEIRL  3.25  (2.1)  2.62  (2.3) 2.16  (2.3)  2.00  (2.3) 2.59  (2.3)
YiS  POSt-SICONDAIR  NONUNI1.  0.14 (0.7)  0.12  (0.6) 0.12  (0.6) 0.12  (0.6) 0.12  (0.6)
YRS  UNIVIRSITY  0.74  (1.7)  0.71  (1.8) 0.32  (1.2) 0.39  (1.3) 0.55  (1.5)
1I Rrience  (X4)
POTENTIAL  JOB  EIPIRIINCI  b  18.09  (13.4)  25.07  (14.8)  19.86  (13.9)  26.61  (15.2)  21.80  (14.6)
POTIENTIL  JOB  EIPIR.  SQUIRID  x 10-2 5.06  (6.5) 8.48  (8.5) 5.86  (7.1) 9.38  (9.0) 6.89  (7.9)
TEARS  IN  PRESINT  JOB  6.35  (8.1) 8.70  (9.4) 7.71  (8.8)  11.51  (11.2)  8.30  (9.5)
YEARS  IN  PRESINT  JOB  SQUIRED  x 10-2 1.06  (2.3) 1.65  (3.2) 1.36  (2.6) 2.58  (4.3) 1.59  (3.1)
Other  variables  (V.)
PRIVATI  SCHOOL  c  0.176  0.171  0.108  0.086  0.138
TRAINING  '  0.368  0.340  0.271  0.226  0.307
MARRIED  0.546  0.719  0.641  0.788  0.657
hIGRANT  *  0.652  0.752  0.736  0.760  0.716
MOTEIR'S  YRS  SCHOOLING  f  4.09  (3.6) 3.41  (3.5) 2.62  (3.2) 2.42  (3.0) 3.23  (3.4)
FIAITE'S  7PS  SCSOOLING  £  5.80  (3.8) 5.10  (3.7) 4.28  (3.5i 4.07  (3.1) 4.91  (3.7)
LIBOR  UNION  MEMBER  0.312  ---  0.256  ---  0.289
JOB  CONTRACT  0.224  ---  0.228  ---  0.225
DIPLOMA  SICONDARY  TICINICAL  0.024  0.035  0.027  0.016  0.025
DIPLOMA  POST-SECONDIAR  NOIUNII.  0.022  0.023  0.015  0.020  0.020
UNIVIRSITY  DIGRII  0.083  o.oeo  0.032  0.034  0.059
Notes:  * Means  (standard  deviations  i: i:arentheses).
b Age  - schooling  - years  repeated  - 6.
t Last  school  attended  private.
£  Attended  post-school  training  course.
*  Migrated  to  present  location.
f,I  If missing,  years  measured  at  sample  sean  and Individual  assuigoed  value  of I on separate missing  value
indicator  variable.Potential  experience  is  imputed  in  the  usual  way,  with experience
set  equal  to age  minus  years  of schooling  attended  (years  completed  plus
years  repeated)  minus  six.  In  this  study,  however,  explicit  information  on
each  worker's  experience  in  his  present  job  was obtained  during  the
household  interview,  and  this  measure  is also  included  in the  estimating
equations. 7
Mother's  and  father's  education  are  included  in  the  earnings
functions  as  measures  of family  background.  Included  alsu  are  variables
(1 if  yes,  0 if  no)  to capture  the  effects  of each  o2 the following  on
hourly  earnings: (a)  having  attended  a private  schoc  . at the  highest  level
of education  attended;  (b)  being  married;  (c)  having  received  post-school
training  (cf.  Arriagada  1988);  and (d)  having  migrated  to the  present  city
of residence  from  somewhere  else.
We estimated  this  earnings  function  (referred  to as  Model  I in
the  tables  below)  for  the  entire  sample  of  male  workers  and  then
separately: (a)  by region  --  that  is,  for  the residents  of Lima (LIMA)  and
for  those  in other  urban  areas  (OUAs);  (b)  by sector  --  for  those  working
in  the  wage sector  (WAGE)  and  for  those  who are  self-employed  (SELF);  and
finally,  (c)  by the  intersection  of region  and  sector  --  for  each  of  the
four  groups  (LIMAIWAGE,  LIMA/SELF,  OUAsIWAGE,  OUAs/SELF).  We conducted
tests  of sample  homogeneity  across  the  various  groups  and  concluded  that
country-wide  or region-wide  estimates  would  be biased  --  see  table  6.
Accordingly,  no regression  results  are  presented  here except  for  the  four
groups  separately.
Table  6
TFSTS  OF SAMPLE  HOMOGENEITY
Degrees  of  Significance
F-value  freedom  level
Lima  vs OUAs  3.26  16  and  2,178  .01
Wage-  vs self-employed  1.92  16  and  2,178  .05
Lima/wage  vs Lima/self  vs  2.08  48 and  2,146  .01
OUAs/wage  vs OUAs/self
Note:  For  the  test  statistic,  see  Chow (1960)  or Johnston  (1972,
pp. 197-207).
7  We also  tested  for  interactive  effects  between  experience  and
schooling. None  of  the  multiplicative  terms  was  statistically  significant,
and  the  results  are  not  reported  here.
13Model  II.  For  the  wage employed  only,  we present  a  second  set  of
equations  controlling  for  'institutional'  factors  'factors  other  than  the
individual's  own  human  capital)  that  are  likely  to affect  earnings. Binary
variables  are  added  indicating:  (a)  that  the  individual  belongs  to a labor
union,  which  can  be expected  to increase  wages  by restricting  the  supply  of
workers,  and (b)  that  he holds  a  contract,  which  may either  raise  earnings
(if,  say,  a contract  is  an indicator  of the  worker's  all-around  strong
bargaining  position  vis-a-vis  the  employer)  or lower  them (if  rates  of  pay
are  traded  off  against  job  security  in  the  labor  market).
Model  III. Neither  Model  I  nor  Model  II,  however,  makes  a
distinction  between  the  effect  of spending  one  more  year  in school  and  the
effect  of  obtaining  an educational  credential  or certificate  at  the  end  of
a full  course  of study  consisting  usually  of several  years  in school. To
separate  ;hese  two  statistical  effects,  we experimented  with a third  set  of
equatio  - in  which  dummy  variables  were added  indicating  certificates
received  by individuals  in the  last  level  of education  attended. In  Model
III,  we tried  to control  for  certification  effects  in  order  that  the
regression  coefficient  on each  corresponding  education  spline  variable
could  be said  to  measure  the  pure  effect  of just  one  mo.e  year  of the
particular  level  and  type  of schooling. 8
A statistically  significant  effect  associated  with the  holding  of
an educational  certificate  may indicate  one (or  more)  of the  following
three  things: (a)  that  there  is  economic  rent  included  in the  wages  paid
the  certificate  holders;  (b)  that  those  who earn  the  certificate  are  simply
smarter  on average  than  those  who do  not;  or (c)  that  certificate  holders
actually  learn  more  per  time  spent  in  school  than  those  who drop  out. 9 The
regression  coefficient  on  the  certificate  variable  may,  in other  words,  be
interpreted  as a  market  segmentation  effect,  an innate  ability  effect,  or
an educational  effect  (or,  most  probably,  a combination  of all  three).
Only in  the  case  of Lima  wage employees  do  we find  any
statistically  significant  effect  associated  with  the  holding  of education
certificates,  and  there  only in  the  case  of  university  degree  holders. For
the  other  three  groups,  there  are  either  too  few  individuals  in  the  sample
with secondary  or post-secondary  credentials  to  obtain  trustworthy
estimates,  or  where  there  are  sufficient  numbers,  the  estimated  effects  are
not  statistically  different  from  zero. Accordingly,  Model  III  estimates
8 Three  certificate  variables  were added. The first  indicates
possession  of a secondary  technical  diploma,  the  second  a post-secondary
nonuniversity  diploma,  and  the  third  a  university  degree. (No  diploma  is
given  at the  end  of a secondary  general  course,  which  is  not  to say  that
there  could  not  still  be a ufinishing-the-coursel  effect,  additional  to the
value  of one  more  year  of school.)
9 The  last  effect  might  occur  in a  situation  where  all  parts  of a
course  of study,  like  pieces  in  a jig-saw  puzzle,  are  needed  before  an
individual  can  fully  understand  and  make  use  of any  one  part.
14are presented here only for the group of Lima wage employees.  And for
them, because the inclusion of lower-level certificate variables results in
nonsignificant regression coefficients and also renders  the coefficients
for the corresponding years-of-education variables nonsignificant owing to
the collinearity between years of education and certification, the Model
III equation includes only the university degree certificate variable.
Selectivity Bias.  We do not have a sufficient number of
theoretically relevant background variables to test for self-selectivity in
an individual's choice between VTE and general education, given that this
decision could have been made far in the past and the PLSS data set is
cross-sectional rather than longitudinal.  We do, however, test for
selectivity in the present-day choice between wage employment and self-
employment.  Economic theory says that an individual  will choose whichever
sector of employment promises the highest net marginal returns.  OLS
(ordinary least squares) estimates of the earnings equations specified
above will be biased to the extent that there are variables omitted from an
earnings equation that determine the probability of being in either the
wage or self-employed sector.  Their omission implies that the error terms
of the earnings and labor supply equations will be correlated.
To take into account the choice between  wage employment and self-
employment, i.e., to adjust for selectivity bias,  we use the standard
econometric procedure introduced  by Heckman (1976; 1979).  We first
estimated a set of probit equations to determine, separately, for all males
in Lima, and then for all  males in OUAs:  (a) the probability of being
employed in the private  wage sector versus all other options (including,
but not restricted to, 3elf-employment),  and (b) the probability of being
self-employed versus all else (including,  but not restricted to, wage
employment).  The following right-hand variables were used in estimating
the probit functions:  age, age squared, the five splines representing each
level and type of schooling, the three educational certificate variables,
the training and marriage vEriables, years in the current place of
residence, annual unearned income, father's occupation, the number of
children in the household, and hectares of land  owned by the household.
From each probit an estimate of the inverse  Mills-tatio, or "lambda" (),
was derived.
In the second step of the adjustment  procedure, we re-estimated
the wage equations with lambda included on the right-hand side to control
for the probability of being in the particular sector.  With the exception
of the self-employed in Lima, we found no evidence of selectivity bias in
the original OLS equations, in  which one assumes that  wage workers and the
self-employed are random subsets of the active population of workers.  The
addition of lambda did not affect the regression coefficients, and the
coefficients on lambda itself  were not significantly different from zero.
For the self-employed in Lima, however, the coefficient on lambda
was positive and significant, and its inclusion lowered the estimated
effects of some variables including those of both general and technical
secondary schooling.  This points to the existence of unobserved factors in
Lima that may increase both the probability of becoming self-employed and
15also  the likelihood  of above-average  hourly  earnings. Quite  possibly,
those  with  greater  innate  entrepreneurial  ability  are  more likely  than
others  to select  self-employment.  By failing  to correct  for  the  self-
selection  of this  group,  the  returns  to education  are  biased  upwards  to
include  the  effect  of this  unmeasured  entrepreneurial  ability. For  this
group,  the  selectivity-corrected  estimates  will  be displayed  alongside  the
OLS  estimates.
6. Estimation  of the  Hourly  Earnings  Function
This  section  presents  the  regression  results. The  findings  are
described  and  discussed,  first  for  the  group  of  private-sector  wage
employees,  and  then  for  the  self-employed.
Wage Employees. The  estimates  for  the  wage-employed  are  given  in
table  The  hourly  earnings  of this  group  are  quite  well  explained  by the
human  c  Aital  earnings  function. The  R2s of the  final  regression  are  0.446
for  Metropolitan  Lima  and  0.369  for  Peru's  OUAs.
In  the  case  of  Lima,  all  three  models  could  be estimated
reliably. For  other  urban  areas,  estimates  of the  first  two  models  only
are  reported  because  relatively  few  individuals  in the  OUA  sample  possessed
the  educational  certificates  needed  to distinguish  Model  III  from  Model  II.
For  Lima,  the inclusion  of the  university  degree  variable  does  not  add  to
the explanatory  power  of the  regression  equation,  but it reduces  the
estimated  effect  of one  more  year  of university  education  by about  four
percentAge  points,  which  amounts  to roughly  a  third.
The  two  institutional  factors  (union  membership  and  job  contract)
are  strongly  related  to  ecrnings  in both  regions,  with  t-values  ranging
from  1.7  to 6.0. Together  the  two  factors  uniquely  explain  about  one
percent  of the  observed  variation  in earnings  in  Lima,  and  eight  percent  in
OUAs.  Their  addition  to the  regression  equations,  in  Model  II,  neither
lowers  nor  raises  the  schooling  coefficients  to any  great  extent  (never  by
as  much as  two  percentage  points)  nor  in  any  systematic  fashion  (sometimes
in  one  direction,  sometimes  the  other).
For  both  Lima  and  OUAs,  the  effect  of an additional  year  of
education --  be it general or technical, primary, secondary, or tertiary --
diminishes  as  we move from  lower-  to  higher-order  models  and  there..by
control  for  additional  nonhuman  capital  variables.1 0 In  Lima  the  highest
marginal  returns  (8-9  percent  in  Model  III,  which  controls  for  the
possession  of a  university  degree,  and  13-14  percent  in  Model  II,  which
does  not)  and  in  OUAs  the  lowest  marginal  returns  (4-6  percent)  accrue  to
terti:kry  education. This  supports  the  casual  observation  that  high-level
10  The  results  obtained  for  a  simpler  model,  not  shown  here,  analogous
to the  original  human  capital  earnings  function  introduced  by Mincer  (1974)
and  including  just  the  schooling  splines  and  experience  variables,  had  the
largest  coefficients  and  largest  t-values.
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RIGRISSIOI  RISULTS  --  WAIG  IEPLOJIES
Llua  Other  Urban  Areas
Model  I  lodel  11  Model  III  Nodel  I  Lodel  1I
INTIRCIPT  -0.027  (-0.14)  -0.042  (-0.22)  -0.024  (-0.12)  -0.740 (-3.34)..  -0.528  (-2.50)..
YRS  PRIMART  (pi)  0.052 (1.37)  0.052 (1.36)  0.053 (1.40)  0.098 (2.27)+.  0.080 (1.95)+
IRS  SICONDIIR  TICINICIL  (02)  0.056 (2.18)++ 0.057 (2.23).t  0.057 (2.25)++ 0.085 (2.52)+.  0.069 (2.15)..
IRS  SICONDIAR  GNIIRAL  (Ps)  0.061 (4.03)4+ 0.058 (3.84).4  0.058 (3.86)4+ 0.086 (4.07)#.  0.076 (3.81)+.
IRS  POST-SECONDAIR  IONWNII.  (04)  0.134 (3.72).+  0.117 (3.24)..  0.114 (3.19)++ 0.035 (0.60)  0.041 (0.74)
IRS  UNIVIRSITY  (As)  0.147 (9.24).+  0.134 (8.32)+4 0.090 (3.91)4+ 0.056 (1.74)+  0.048 (1.58)
POTINTIAL  JOB  EIPRIIIICI  0.037 (4.73)++ 0.036 (4.57)44  0.035 (4.4)+.  0.064 (5.60)#.  0.054 (4.96)..
POTENTIAL  JOB  IIPRIDIICE  SQUARED  2 10-'  -0.044  (-2.95)4t -0.042  (-2.82)4. -0.040  (-2.70)++  -0.095  (-4.67)+4 -0.078  (-4.04)+4
YIEAS  IN  PRESEIt  JOB  0.023 (2.65)+.  0.021 (2.39).*  0.020 (2.30)++ 0.039 (3.14)++ 0.031 (2.54)4+
YEARS  II PRISIII  JOB  SQUIRID  i  10-2  -0.049  (-1.68)+  -0.050  (-1.72)i  -0.047  (-1.63)i  -0.077 -1.95)  -0.063  (-1.66).
PRIVATI  SCHOOL  0.100 (1.49)  0.111 (1.68)i  0.129 (1.95)44 0.143 (1.22)  0.114 (1.03)
TRAIIING  0.181 (3.59)#4 0.170  (3.38).4  0.177  (3.55),.  -0.031  (-0.38)  -0.069  (-0.89)
MARRIID  0.270 (4.32)44  0.262 (4.23)++ 0.246 (3.97)++ 0.038 (0.41)  -0.057  (-0.64)
MIGRANT  -0.061 (1.17)  -0.049  (-0.94)  -0.050  (-0.96)  0.089 (1.23)  0.049 (0.65)
MOTIER'S  YIS  SCHOOLING  0.017  (1.92)+  0.017 (2.00)++ 0.016 11.89i  0.037 (2.56)4.  0.037 (2.69)+.
FIAITR'S  YRS  SCHOOLING  0.029 (3.C9).4  0.028 (3.65)++ 0.028 (3.67)++ 0.030 (2.27)4+ 0.022 (1.81)+
LIBOR  UNION  MEMBIR  0.148 (2.74)++ 0.148 (2.76)++  0.505 (6.02)+4
JOB  COTRIACT  0.114 (1.97)*+ 0.100 (1.71)4  0.263 (3.12)+4
UNIVERSITY  DEGREE  0.357 (2.71)+"
IDJUSTED  P2  0.433  0.442  0.447  0.288  0.369
F VALUE  [DEGREES  Of  FIRIDOM]  34.86  [17,7381t4  32.50  [19,7361++  31.51  [22,7331++  13.54  [17,5091+4  17.17  [19,5071+
Relatie  Ifecti
VTS  Ts GIEIRIL
Secondary  (P:  - 3) -0.005  (-0.23)  -0.001  (-0.06)  -0.001  (-0.06)  -0.001  (-0.04)  -0.007  (-0.25)
Tertiary  (O4  - Psi)  -0.013  (-0.34)  -0.017  (-0.48)  -0.025  (-0.64)  -0.021  (-0.33)  -0.007  (-0.10)
SICONDARY  is  PRIMARY
Technical  (pi  - 0i)  0.004  (0.07)  0.005 (0.10)  0.004  (0.0t)  -0.013  (-0.22)  -0.011  (-0.19)
General  (Os  - P0) 0.009  (0.20)  0.006  (0.14) 0.005  (0.12)  -0.012 (-0.22)  -0.004 (-0.06)
TIRTIIRY  is SICONDARY
PSMg  (04  - 03)  0.073 (1.82)+  0.059 (1.49)  0.056 (1.39)  -0.051  (-0.77)  -0.035  (-0.55)
University  (Ds  - Ps)  0.086 (3.54)..  0.076 (3.12)"+ 0.031 (1.07)  -0.030  (-0.71)  -0.028  (-0.72)
Note:  t-statistics  in  parentheses;  two  pluses  (one  plus):  coefficient  statistically  significant  at  5S (10%)  level  i.  a  two-tailed
test.private-sector  jobs in  Peru  are  concentrated  in  Lima.  Even  the  high rates
of  migration  into  Lima  have  not,  to date,  brought  pay  rates  between  the  two
regions  into  equilibrium. The  marginal  returns  to lower  levels  of
education,  though  not  always  reliably  estimated  (for  the  Lima sample,  Pi
has  a standard  error  nearly  three-fourths  its  own  size),  are in  the  five-
to-ten  percent  annual  range  both  in  Lima  and  in  OUAs.
In both  regions,  general  education  appears  to  yield  higher
marginal  returns  than  VTE.  The  difference  is  never  large,  however,  less
than  one  percentage  point  in  the  case  of secondary  education  and  less  than
three  in  the  case  of tertiary  education. To see  whether  any  of these
differences  are  statistically  significant,  t-tests  were conducted. In  no
case  can  the  null  hypothesis  be rejected,  even  at the 10  percent  level  (see
t-tests  for  "relative  effects"  in  bottom  half  of table). Neither  are  there
significant  differences  in  the  marginal  returns  to different  levels  of
education. For  statistical  purposes,  the  hourly  earnings  functions  in
table  7 could  have  been  specified  as  having  just  one  years-of-education
variable.
The  regression  results  with respect  to the  schooling  variables
(for  the  highest  of the  three  models  estimated,  i.e.,  Model  III  in  the  case
of Lima  and  Model  II in  the  case  of  OUAs)  are  summarized  graphically  in
figure  2.  The slope  of any  graph  indicates  the  marginal  effect  of an
additional  year  of education  of a particular  level  and  type.11
A two-headed  arrow  between  a  graph  and  the  horizontal  line
indicates  that the  slope  of the  graph  is  significantly  different  from  zero
(cf  the  t-values  for  the  Pi coefficients  near  the  top  of table  5).  An
arrow  between  two  graphs  indicates  (or  would  indicate  --  there  is no such
arrow  in figure  2) that  the  difference  between  the  regression  coefficients
for  two  different  types  or adjacent  levels  of education  is significantly
different  from  zero (cf  the  t-values  for  the  Pi - Pi*  differences  at the
bottom  of table  5).  Fat  and  thin  arrows  indicate  statistical  significance
at the  5 and 10  percent  levels,  respectively.
11 The  slope,  which  shows  the  percentage  change  in earnings  associated
with an additioral  year of school,  is calculated  from  the  regression
coefficient,  p, as follows:
[(exp)P  - 1] X 100%
The  marginal  effects  are  shown  here  in linear  form,  with adjustment  of the
vertical  scale  to reflect  the  fact  that  percentage  increments  in earnings
increase  more than  liiiearly.
18Figure  2
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Highest  education  completedSelf-Employed  Workers. The  estimates  for  the  self-employed  are
given  in table  8.  Because  the  self-reported  'earnings"  of self-employed
workers  reflect  not  just  the  return  on past  human  capital  investment
(included  in the  regression  equations)  but  also  the  return  on  physical
capital  belonging  to the  enterprise  (not  included  in  the  equations),  the
regressions  here  explain  only 14-17  percent  of the  variation  in reported
hourly  earnings,  and  the  results  should  be approached  with some  caution.12
The  pattern  of returns  across  diffetent  levels  and  types  of
education  is  more complicated  for  the  self-employed  than it  is for  the
wage-employed.  For  Lima (after  introducing  the  correction  for  selectivity
bias),  the  point  estimate  of  the return  to  an additional  year  of  primary
education  is negative,  and  in  OUAs,  the  same  is true  for  secondary
technical  education,  but  neither  regression  coefficient  approaches
statistical  significance  (the  t-values  are  only  -0.14  and  -0.78,
respectively).  Statistically  significant  marginal  returns  are  found  in  the
following  cases: for  Lima,  secondary  technical  and  university  education,
and  for  OUAs,  primary,  secondary  genere.l,  and  university  education.  The
results  are  presented  graphically  in figure  3.
One anomalous  pair  of findiags  relates  to secondary  technical
education. In  Lima,  the  returns  to  this level  and  type  of education  are
high.  The  point  estimate  exceeds  nine  percent  annually. Although,  when
one looks  at the  graphs  for  Lima,  the  marginal  return  to secondary
technical  appears  higher  than  the  marginal  return  to secondary  general
education,  the  difference  between  the  two is  not  statistically  significant.
In  OUAs,  on the  other  hand,  the  returns  to secondary  technical  education
are  low. The  point  estimate  is actually  negative. The  value,  while  not
significantly  different  from  zero,  is  significantly  smaller  than  the
marginal  return  to secondary  general  education.
Why  should  the  marginal  return  to a year  of secondary  technical
education  be so  much  higher  in  Lima than  in  OUAs?  One  explanation  could  be
that  there  was a difference  in  the  auality  of the  VTE received  by those  now
working  in  the  two  regions. The  data  included  some  indirect  indicators  of
school  quality,  but  only  in relation  to the  primary  school  attended  by each
individual  in  the  sample. These  are  not  useful,  therefore,  in  measuring
the  quality  of secondary  education.
12  Because  earnings  are  self-reported  and  because  respondents  may
confound  the  distinction  between  'gross"  and  'net'  earnings,  the  dependent
variable  for  the  self-employed  can  be expected  to include  substantial
measurement  error. Different  hourly  earnings  regressions  for  all  self-
employed  men  and  women  operating  single-person  enterprises  (a  majority  of
the  self-employed  group  in  the  PLSS  sample)  are  reported  in  Stelcner  et al.
(forthcoming).  There  the  capital  assets  of the  enterprise  are  taken  into
account,  and "earnings"  are  measured  as  the  difference  between  'sales'
(including  the  value  of output  consumed  in  the  household)  and  purchased
recurrent  inputs.
20Table  8
RtESSION  RELTS - SEIF-EM0LHED
IMu  Odther  Urban  Areas
Selectivity
kidel  I  Corrected  MKdel  I
INIERCEPT  0.431  (1.48) -0.716  (-0.94)  -0.192  (-0.77)
M PRIMARY)  0.019  (0.36) -0.008  (-0.14)  0.070  (1.65)+
MM StU  1  ICAL  (g)  0.118  (2.84)++  0.097  (2.28)++  -0.033  (-0.78)
YRS  SE(XMlYN  (2i|L  (  )  0.066  (2.68)++  0.029  (0.87)  0.045  (1.74)+
MG 4 POST-SS[lMR  Nl)  0.084  (1.14)  0.088  (1.27)  0.072  (1.08)
WS  RNEIV1ERST  Z 5)  0.083  (3.08)++  0.082  (3.19)++  0.083  (2.38)++
POlIrfML  JO EXERIEINCE  0.011  (0.81)  0.022  (1.46)  0.046  (3.68)++
WO1DNIL  JKB  MlIEXNZE  SQARED  x 10-2  -0.016  (-0.72)  -0.023  (-1.01)  -0.082  (-4.17)++
YEA1R IN  fRESET  KB  0.027  (1.96)++  0.031  (2.28)++  0.030  (2.65)++
YEARS  IN PRE5T  XB SWMAR!D  x 10-2  -0.044  (-1.11)  -0.053  (-1.33)  -0.052  (-1.82)+
PRIVAIE  SCHOCL  -0.014  (-0.13)  0.007  (-0.07)  0.143  (0.93)
TRAINDNG  0.020  (0.22)  -0.006  (-0.06)  -0.111  (-1.11)
NARRIED  0.265  (2.50)++  0.363  (3.08)4+  0.309  (2.80)++
MIRANr  0.033  (0.34)  0.002  (0.02)  0.082  (0.83)
MCTHE'S  YMM  SOCL  0.035  (2.23)++  0.032  (2.08)++  0.018  (1.06)
IWHER.S  YR S(CH3XLflG  0.010  (0.62)  0.008  (0.60)  0.013  (0.82)
lAMHDU  0.987  (1.64)+
ADJUED)  R2  0.166  0.170  0.142
F  VALUE  OF  EREED04]  5.98  (17,4093++  5.86  [18,4081++  5.88  (17,4823++
Relative  Effects
V1E  vs  GLERML
Seoondsry  *  - p3)  0.052  (1.34)  0.068  (1.48)  -0.078  (-1.91)+
Tertiary  %p4  - P5)  0.001  (0.01)  0.006  (0.09)  -0.011  (-0.16)
SEXONQR  vs  PRlWiRY
Tecnkical  02  - A)  0.099  (1.38)  0.105  (1.42)  -0.103  (-1.63)
General  (3 - A)  0.047  (0.74)  0.037  (0.54)  -0.025  (-0.47)
UIS  vs  S1OW
P5U  (4  - P3)  0.018  (0.23)  0.059  (0.74)  0.027  (0.36)
University  (p5 - p3)  0.017  (0.42)  0.053  (1.15)  0.038  (0.78)
Note:  t-statiStics  in  parentheses;  two  pluses  (one  p1ls) coefficient  statistically  significant
at  51  (102)  lemel  In  a wo-tailed  test.Figure  3
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Highest education completedInotead,  we have estimated  the location  of the  secondary  school
attended,  on  the assumption  that  schools  that  were located  in  cities  might
have  been  of  hi_'er  quality  on average  than  those  located  in towns  or
villages. Since  respondents  were not  asked  about  the  location  of schools
attended,  we use as a  proxy  the  place  of residence  of the  individual  when
he  was of school  attendance  age  --  whether  he then  lived  in  a city  or not.
Table  9 shows  where  workers  lived  when  they  were attending  secondary
school.
Table  9
OF WORKERS  WHO  ATTENDED  SECONDARY  SCHOOL,
PERCENTAGE  WHO  THEN  LIVED IN A  CITY
Type  of  secondary  school  attended
Individuals  now
living  in:  Technical  General  Both
Self-employed  workers
Metropolitan  Lima  69.2%  68.22  68.3%
(18126)  (176/258)  (194/286)
Other  urban  areas  29.62  44.9Z  43.31
(8127)  (109/243)  (117/270)
All  urban  areas  of  Peru  49.12  56.9X  56.1Z
(26/53)  (285/501)  (311/554)
Wage employees
Metropolitan  Lima  63.2Z  70.9Z  70.4Z
(24/38)  (4051571)  (429/609)
Other  urban  areas  42.12  46.7Z  46.22
(16/38)  (129/276)  (145/314)
All urban  areas  of Peru  52.62  63.01  62.21
(40/76)  (534/847)  (574/923)
Fifty-six  percent  of all  self-employed  workers  who attended
secondary  school  lived  in  a city  as  youngsters  and,  we shall  assume
therefore,  attended  uhigher  quality"  schools  than  those  who lived  in towns
or villages. Of the  four  groups  of self-employed  workers,  the  one  with  the
highest  percentage  (69.22)  of individuals  who  then  lived  in  a city  is  the
group  who attended  secondary  tachnical  schools  and  now  live  in  Metropolitan
23Lima.  The  group  with the  smallesi.  percentage  (29.6X)  --  nuch smaller  than
for  any  other  group,  including  all  of the  wage employee  groups  --  is  the
group  of technical  school  attendees  now  living  in  OUAs.  Although  the
evidence  is  not  conclusive,  the  pattern  of where  individuals  lived  as
youngsters  does  support  the  hypothesis  that  the  quality  of education
received  by the  self-employed  now  living  in  Lima  was  higher  than  that
received  by the  self-employed  now  living  in  other  urban  areas. This  may,
in  part,  explain  the  anomaly  pointed  out  in figure  3.
Relative  Returns  to  VTE and  General  Education. The  most
pertinent  conclusion  here  with regard  to the  returns  to  education  in Peru
is  es6entially  a null  conclusion:  With  the  one  exception  of education  at
the  secondary  level  for  self-employed  workers  in  other  urban  areas,  there
are  no significant  differences  in the  marginal  returns  to education  in the
two  scholastic  streams. In  all  other  cases,  a  year  of  VTE is  the
statistical  equivalent  of a year  of general  education,  at least  in terms  of
their  impact  on earnings. Why,  in light  of the  officially  stated  intent
that  VTE should  provide  students  wiith  specific  skills  oriented  to the
manifest  requirements  of the labor  market,  should  this  be so?
One likely  explanation  is the  lack  of curricular  differenLes
between  the  two  streams. As discussed  in  Section  2, it is reasonable  to
suspect  that,  because  of shortages  of appropriately  trained  teachers  and
suitable  equipment,  and  also  because  of the  difficulty  of actually
specifying  the  technical  requirements  of the  labor  market,  VTE institutions
in  Peru  do  not  offer  education  that  is  substantially  different  from  that
which  is  offered  in institutions  designated  as  general  institutions.
Moreover,  and  as a consequence  of the  similarity  in  the  curricula,  otudents
from  the  two  streams  may end  up,  once  employed,  filling  jobs  that  ate  also
substantially  the  same.
Education  and  Manual  Work.  In  the  data  set,  workers'  jobs  can  be
classified  into  seven  major  categories:  professional,  managerial,
services,  sales,  clerical,  farming,  and  manual. These  categories  do not
relate  noatly  to  the  career  objectives  of the  two  educational  streams,  but
it does  seem  reasonable  to  predict  that  graduates  of VTE  would  be somewhat
more likely  than  graduates  of general  education  to  be employed  as  manual
workers. To test  this  hypothesis,  we postulated  a logistic  probability
model  to  predict  the  likelihood  of being  thus  employed. The  observed
dependent  variable  assumes  the  values  1  if  an individual  worked  in a  manual
job  and  0 if  he  worked  in  any  of  the  other  job  categories.  On the  right-
hand  side  of the  equation,  in  addition  to  the  variable  indicating  type  of
education  received  (1  if  VTE,  0 if  general)  we included  three  other
variables  that  could  be expected  to affect  the likelihood  of being  employed
in  a  manual  job:  POTENTIAL  JOB  EXPERIENCE,  YEARS  IN  PRESENT  JOB,  and
MIGRANT  (see  table  5 above).
The logit  regression  was estimated  separately,  using  a  maximum
likelihood  procedure,  for  each  of eight  worker  groups: within  each  of  the
four  regionallsectoral  groups,  separately  for  those  whose  highest  level  of
education  was  secondary  and  again  for  those  whose  highest  level  was
tertiary. The results  are  summarized  in  table  10. Only for  the  tertiery
24education  group  now living  in  Lima  is  there  a  statistically  significant
effect  of  VTE  on the likelihood  of being  employed  as a  manual  worker. For
this  group,  graduates  of  VTE are  7- to 9-times  more likely  to  be in  manual
jobs,  arnd  the  null  hypothesis  (that  there  is  no relat. 4on  between  VTE  and
manual  work)  cannot  be rejected  at  the  5  percent  level. For  all  of the
other  six  worker  groups,  although  graduates  of  VTE are  more likely  than
graduates  of general  education  to  be  working  in  manual  jobs (up  to 2-times
more likely),  in no case  is  this  effect  statistically  significant  at  the
the  10  percent  level. One  may conclude  from  this  analysis  that  the
relation  in  Peru  between  the  type  of educatioi,  taken  in  school  and  the  type
of  work  that  an individual  performs  later  when employed  is,  in  general,
quite  weak.
Table  10
MWNAL  WM=  BY  WUATh1N,  MEMR,  AND  HIGESr  I  OF  EO  WlCATIONATTK
Hi&est  level  of  education  attened
Secadary  Tertiary
Nnber  of Percent  Effect  of  VIE  odds  Umber  of Percent  Effect  of  VIE  Odds
munral  of  in  logit  re-  ratio  mmwal  of  in  logit  re-  ratio
workers  grow  gressicn  0a  (9)b  workers  group gression  (pfc  (G)d
Netrpolitan  Lima
Wagse  eployees  221  51  0.504  (1.43)  1.7  19  11  2.223  (4.11)++  9.2
Self-employed  96  51  0.505  (1.15)  1.7  29  31  1.982  (3.52)++  7.3
Other urban  m
Wage  emlnplys  135  55  0.514  (1.38)  1.7  16  24  0.693 (0.94)  2.0
Self-eployed  94  47  0.642 (1.47)  1.9  17  24  0.075 (0.11)  1.1
Notes:  t-staistis  in parethess;  two  pluse  (cm plus)  = logit  coefficient  statistically  sigfint
at  5%  (101) in  a two-tailed  test.
a,c  Depaxit  variable  in the  loot  regressicns  1 if  mral  worker,  0 odtxeise.  VIE variable:  1 if
hi*wst  education VIE, 0 otherise;  p  - lgit  coefficient  on this  variable.  Other independent
varibles:  PENffAL  JO EXPERDI  ,  YFRS  IN PREENT  JOB, and  MIGMQr.
b,d  9 - EXP(P), to  be interpreted  as  follosJ:  "An  Individual hii  took  VIE is  0-thmes nore  likely  to
be eployed  as a nurual  wrker  than  an individual  who  did not  (given the  other  foar
charmcteristics  controlled  for  in  the  equation)."
257. Unit  Costs
Our results  on the  determinants  of earnings  in  Peru  have
corroborated  a finding  reported  for  some  other  countries,  that  the returns
to investment  in  VTE are  comparable  to  the returns  to investment  in  general
education. In  most  of the  studies  done  elsewhere,  however,  the  costs  of
VTE  have  been  shown  to  exceed  the  costs  of general  education. In Peru,  no
such  cost  differential  is  clearly  evident. Table  11  presents  the  average
central  government  recurrent  expenditure  per  stulent  per  year in  secondary
and  post-secondary  education  in  all  years  between  1960  and 1981  for  which
data  were available. 13
For  post-secondary  education,  although  some  year-to-year
variation  exists,  the  Ministry  of Education  (MoE)  data  show  quite
consistently  that  less  was spent  per  year  of study  in  nondegree  granting
institutions  than Ln  universities.  The  average  ratio  of VTE  costs  to
general  education  costs  was 0.8  at the  tertiary  level  between  1970  and
1981. Since  most  of the individuals  in  our 1985/86  sample  would  have
attended  post-secondary  education  before  1982,  the  period  covered  by the
data  series  is qut-de  relevant  for  the  purpose  at  hand.
The  situation  with regard  to  unit  costs  at  the  secondary  level  is
much less  clear. According  to the  MoE figures,  VTE costs  were  between  two
and  three  times  more  than  general  education  costs  in  the  period  prior  to
1970. For 1978  and  1979,  the  last  two  years  in the  available  series,  VTE
again  outstripped  general  education  in  terms  of  unit costs. For  the
intervening  years,  howeveo.,  the  costs  of the  two  educational  streams  appear
to  have  been  nearly  equivalent.  VTE's  costs  exceeded  general  education's  on
average  by about  10  percent  only.
Thers  is  little  in  the  history  of  Peruvian  education  and  the
reforms  announced  in  1972  and  1982  that  helps  to  explain  the  wild  swings  in
the  relative  costs  of  secondary  VTE and  general  education.  Nearly  all  of
the  shifts  in the  relative  positi  ns of the  two  are  accounted  for  by shifts
in  the  former  rather  than  the  latter. Although  there  was an overall
downward  trend  over  the  period,  the  fluctuations  in expenditure  per  general
education  student  between  1960  and  1979  were  comparatively  small,  the
reported  figure  in the  highest  year (1965)  being  just  about  double  that  in
the  lowest  (1979). In the  case  of  VTE  on the  other  hand,  reported
expenditure  per  student  in real  terms  was nearly  four  times  larger  in 1965
than  in 1977. Some  possible  explanations  for  these  puzzling  figures  will
be considered  in  the  following  section.
13  Owing  to  the  absence  of data  on unsubsidized  educational  costs
incurred  by individuals,  on  expenditure  by lower  levels  of government,  and
on capital  costs  whatever  the  source  of financing,  the  discussion  of  costs
in  this  study  will refer  only  to recurrent,  central  government  expenditures.
26Tab2l  11
RCMMNr  ECFIInr1R  PER  STUDEWN,  1960-1981
VTE/general epamediture  ratio
Expnditure  per  student  (constant  1985 Insis)  SocxcIdary  Post-secondary
Secondary  Secondary  Pbst-sec.  AmIal  Average  Amnal  Average
Prilmry  teimcLAal  general  nruni-mv.  University  (b)/(c)  1970-77  (d)/(e)  1970-81
Year  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h)  (i)
1960  587  3,941  1,412  . . 2.8
1965  989  5,075  1,941  . 2.6
1970  923  1,866  1,634  4,933  8,754  1.1  0.6
1971  922  1,513  1,621  6,150  9,336  0.9  0.7
1972  1,184  1,645  1,919  4,294  7,673  0.9  0.6
1973  1,021  1,903  1,765  7,333  8,008  1.1  0.9
1974  994  1,705  1,643  6,820  6,318  1.0  1.1
1975  983  1,463  1,424  6,008  8,472  1.0  0.7
1976  956  1,426  1,287  6,973  6,008  1.1  1.2
1977  861  1,303  1,008  5,029  5,916  1.3  0.9
1978  638  2,681  1,098  4,604  4,676  2.4  1.0
1979  550  2,163  932  4,206  4,851  2.3  0.9
1980  915  . . 3,828  5,574  . 0.7
1981  835  . . 3,443  5,421  . 0.6
Sources:  Per  student enditures  were  suppLUed  by the  Mbiostry  of  FAdcation  and reported
in  Arregui (1988).  C)P deflators  ire  provided by the  Instituto  Nacional de
Estadistica  asd reDorted in Webb  (1987).
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To see  the  implications  of the  above  findings  for  educational
policy  in  Peru requires  that  the  data  on  marginal  costs  and  marginal
returns  be  placed  in juxtaposition.  That  the  returns  to a  year  of  VTE and
a  year  of general  education  are  found  to be essentially  the  same  implies
one  thing  if  VTE is  more  expensive  to provide  than  general  education  and
quite  another  if  the  unit  costs  of  the  two  are  much  the  same. Table  12
summarizes  the  findings  from  earlier  sections  on  the  costs  and  returns  to
VTE and  general  education  in  Peru.
The  comparison  between  costs  and  returns  is  clear-cut  in  the  case
of  post-secondary  education.  Here,  in  the  four  locational/sectoral  samples
the  return  to a  year  of post-secondary  nonuniversity  education  varies
between  901  and 1101  of the  return  to a  year  of  university  education.
Averaging  across  the  four  samples,  one  may  conclude  that  the  return  to  VTE
in the  country  as a  whole  is just  slightly  below  the  return  to  university
education. This  is quite  consistent  with  the information  on costs,  taken
from  table  11  in the  previous  section. On a year  by year  basis,  unit  costs
in  post-secondary  nonuniversity  education  have  varied  as  a percentage  of
unit  costs  in  university  education  from  a low  of 601  to  a high  of 1201  and
averaged  about  80x.  In  comparing  costs  and  benefits,  one  can  say  that  the
competition'  between  VTE  and  general  education  at the  post-secondary  level
amounts  to a virtual  draw.
The  situation  with regard  to secondary  education  is  more
complicated.  In terms  of averages,  once  again  the  picture  suggests  a high
degree  of equilibrium  between  the  additional  costs  and  additional  returns
of  VTE relative  to general  education.  Both  costs  and  returns  are
approximately  10 higher  on average. For  secondary  education,  however,  the
data  points  are  very  dispersed. For  the  self-employed  in  Lima,  though  the
difference  is not  statistically  significant,  each  year  of VTE  is  associated
with  a proportionate  increase  in  earnings  three  and  a half  times  greater
than  a corresponding  year  of general  education. On the  other  hand,  for  the
self-employed  in  OUAs,  VTE is  negatively  related  to  earnings  (though  not
significantly  so)  whereas  general  education  yields  a  moderately  high
return. In between,  for  both  groups  of  wage  workers,  the  marginal  return
to VTE is  just  slightly  below  the  return  to general  education.
The  pzttern  of  unit  costs  in  secondary  education,  as the  reader
will recall,  is  even  less  stable. Although  the  figures  show  considerable
uniformity  for  the  years  between  1970  and 1977  (the  period  for  which  th¶e
1.1:1  ratio  --  expenditure  on secondary  technical  education  to expenditure
on secondary  general  --  has  been  derived),  the  data  for  the  years  before
1970  and  years  since  1977  show  VTE  to be  much  more  expensive  than  this,  at
least  twice  as  much relative  to general  education. Disregarding  the
earliest  period  --  which,  even  if  the  figures  are  accurate,  is  now "ancient
history'  --  one  must  consider  the  implications  of the  very latest  figures.
28Table  12
COWARZSG4  OF  RELATIVE  BENES AND  RELATIVE  COSTS  OF  YTE  AWND  GENERL  EDUCATION
Secondary  education  Post-secondary  education
Ratio  of  Expenditure  Ratio  of  Expenditure
Return  to  year  of  marginal  returns  ratio  Return  to  year  of:  mrginal  returns  ratio
By group Average  all  Avrage  Non-  By  group Average  all  Avera  g
Technicail  General  (a)/(b)  four  groups  1971-77  university  University  (g)/(h)  four groups  1970-82
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (1)  (g)  (h)  (1)  U)  (k)
Wage am I  oyeee
Lim.  4.43  5.9%  .07  84%  90.3x  9.9
OUAs  7.1X  7.9%  0.9  4.2%  4.9  9.9
1.1  1.1c  0.9  0.6
Self-euiloyed
Line  10.2%  2.9%  3.6  9.2%  6.53  1.1
OUAs  -3.2a  4.6x  -0.7  7.5X  8.7%  0e9
a,b From  table  10.
c Twice  as high  in  1978  and 1979 (the  It  two  years  for  which  data  available).There  are  at least  two  possible  explanations  for  the rapid
escalation  in  the  unit  costs  of  secondary  technical  education  in  the  late
1970s.  One would  be  a  decline  in the  number  of students  enrolled  in  such
schools.  UNESCO  figures  do,  indeed,  show  a  dramatic  decline  in  VTE
enrollments  between  1977  and  1978  (UNESCO  1986),  but  whether  this  was,  in
fact,  real  or  represents  some  sort  of  statistical  artifact  (perhaps  the
result  of a student  reclassification)  is  not  known. In  either  case,  a
decline  in the  denominator  (number  of students)  without  a commensurate
decline  in  the  numerator  (total  expenditure)  will result  in an increase  in
expenditure  per  student. Unless  there  is reason  to  believe  that  the
decline  in  the  number  of students  is  only  a  temporary  phenomenon,  then
there  can  be no justification  for  constructing  additional  schools  of this
type. Until  the  costs  of technical  education  can  be  brought  down  again
(presumably  by closing  some  of the  existing  VTE  schools  and  consolidating
the  rest),  VTE  will remain  a poor  investment  option  relative  to general
education.
An increase  in  unit  costs  could  have  occurred  also  within  the
context  of educational  reform. As discussed  in  Section  2,  under  the  reform
program  introduced  in 1972,  a  number  of new  technical  schools  (ESEPs)  were
constructed.  Given  that  many  of these  schools  did  not  open  their  doors
until  the  late  1970s,  it is likely  that  they  were  not  yet  fully  enrolled
and  that  the  high  unit  costs  noted  above  do not  represent  the  full-
capacity  costs  of providing  this  kind  of education.
Moreover,  to address  some  of the  shortcomings  posited  above  with
respect  to staffing,  equipment,  and  curriculum  of VTE institutions  would
have  required  (to  the  extent  that  they  were,  in fact,  addressed)  inevitably
the  mobilization  of additional  resources.  The  resulting  increase  in
expenditure  per  student  might  be justified  if  it led  to graduates  of the
VTE  system  who  were truly  better  prepared  for  the  world  of  work and  who
could  sustain  a  higher  level  of productivity  over  the  period  of their
working  lives.
We do not  know  to  what extent  the  higher  expenditures  per  VTE
student  after  1977  represents  an anomaly  in the  statistical  series  or
whether  more recent  information  will  corroborate  the  apparent  trend. If it
is determined  that  the  unit  costs  of secondary  VTE  are,  indeed,  on the  rise
in Peru,  then  addit'onal  research  will  be needed  that  can  track  the
occupational  attainment  and  productivity  of  new  output  from  the  VTE system.
All that  can  be said  at this  stage  is  that  any  significantly  higher  costs
of  producing  new  VTE  graduates  could  not  be justified  in light  of the
earnings  performance  of existing  graduates  in  the  Peruvian  work force.
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